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[SUMMER

stitutional. 6 Awkward as the distinction might be, it nevertheless
indicates the court's predisposition as to those who might seek habeas
corpus on similar grounds.
The result of the holding in the Olsen case has been to leave Washington with a firearms statute on the books which lacks an enforcing
proviso. In In re Kahler v. Squire," the Washington court granted
habeas corpus to the petitioner who was being restrained under a now
void judgment and sentence based on the unconstitutional statute.
An attempt was made to remedy this situation at the last session of
the Washington State Legislature with the introduction of Proposed
Senate Bill 169.1' This bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee
and, by resolution March 14, 1957, was "indefinitely postponed.""
It appears that the Washington court with the Olsen decision has
departed from the normal rule favoring a constitutional interpretation
when such an interpretation is readily available.
LEWIs GuTERSoN
CONTRACTS
Mutual Assent-Formation of Construction Subcontracts-Use of
Subcontractor's Bid as Acceptance. In the recent case of Milone
& Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc.' the court held that the use
of a subcontractor's bid by a general contractor in preparing his bid for
the prime contract, did not constitute an acceptance of the subcontractor's bid.
The defendant and several other general contractors had been invited
to bid competitively for the work of constructing four government buildings. General contractors by trade practice compute their bids according to offers which they receive from various subcontractors. The
plaintiff, a subcontractor, telephoned the defendant and other general
contractors and inquired whether they desired his bid on that portion
1648 Wn.2d at 548, 295 P2d at 326.
17

149 Wash. Dec. 194, 299 P.2d 570 (1956).

VI That

bill was designed to amend several sections of the Firearms Act. Section 6
of that bill, which was to delete the unconstitutional RCW 9.41.160, read as follows:
"Any person convicted of committing a crime of violence when armed with a pistol,
or who, having been convicted of a crime of violence, shall thereafter violate any of
the provisions of RCW 9.41.010 through 9.41.160, shall be guilty of a felony and may
be punished therefor by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year
nor more than ten years. All other violations of the provisions of RCW 9.41.010
through 9.41.160 shall be misdemeanors and punishable as such under the laws of the

state of Washington."
19 See Legislative Record for the Thirty-fifth Session of the Washington Legislature (January 14-March 14) No. 8.
1 149 Wash. Dec. 354, 301 P2d 759 (1956).
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of the proposed work involving installation of water mains and sewers.
Since he received favorable replies, the plaintiff submitted a bid on the
installation work to both the defendant and to each of those other firms.
The defendant also received bids on the installation work from other
subcontractors; however, he used the plaintiff's bid figures in his own
bid for the prime contract. After the prime contract was awarded to
him, the defendant subcontracted with a firm other than the plaintiff for
the performance of the installation work, although the plaintiff's bid
figures on this work were the ones used to secure the prime contract.
The plaintiff then brought this action contending that the defendant,
by using the plaintiff's bid, had formed with the plaintiff a contract
implied in fact for the performance of the work; consequently, the
defendant's failure to permit the plaintiff to do that work was a breach
of the contract. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff and
awarded him damages in an amount equal to the prospective profits the
plaintiff would have made on the job.
On appeal, this judgment was reversed on the grounds that no contract had been formed. The court conceded arguendo that the plaintiff's
bid was an offer to perform the specified work at the designated price;
but it denied that the defendant's use of the bid was an act operative as
an acceptance of the bid. The reason given was that the defendant's
act, rather than indicating present assent, could properly be interpreted
merely as an expression of an intention to accept the bid in the future.
The former Washington decision in Western Aspkalt Co. v. Valle,'
upon which the plaintiff relied, was not regarded as requiring a contrary
interpretation. The court added that the evidence of a trade usage to
the effect that use of a subcontractor's bid creates an implied contract to
form a later subcontract, was inadmissible to prove the existence of
this contract.
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal contract is necessary for the formation of such a contract, whether it be
designated as "express" or "implied in fact." 3 An offer or an acceptance
may be made wholly or partly by verbal or non-verbal conduct.4
Whether conduct which manifests an intention constitutes an expression
of assent, that is, an offer or an acceptance, depends primarily on the
meaning to be given to that conduct. For the purpose of ascertaining
that meaning, two principles of interpretation are ordinarily utilized.
-25 Wn.2d 428, 171 P.2d 159 (1946).
3
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 20 (1932).
&Ibid.§ 26.
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The first principle is that manifestations of intention having reference
to the formation of an agreement are given the meaning which the party
making the manifestations should reasonably expect that the other party
would give to them.' The second principle is that when manifestations
of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning, an interpretation
is preferred which operates more strongly against the person from whom
they proceed.'
This last mentioned principle is the basic explanation for the rule
applied in R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child and Williams v.
Favret,8 the decisions upon which the Washington court relied in the
Milone case. The Daum and Williams cases were both suits by general
contractors (offerees) against subcontractors (offerors) who had revoked
their bids after the general contractors had used them and had informed
the subcontractors of that fact by verbal reply. In each case the reply
was held not to be an acceptance of the subcontractor's bid. The rule
applied was that an unequivocal acceptance is necessary for the formation of a contract.9 The rationale of this rule is that an offeror is entitled
to know in clear terms whether an offeree accepts his proposal."0 It
seems clear that this rule operates primarily as a defense to an offeror
who denies the existence of an alleged contract on the grounds that his
offer was not accepted. Of greater significance, however, is the fact
that this rule is no more than a specific formulation of the second principle of interpretation mentioned above, which advocates that equivocal
manifestations be interpreted so as to operate more strongly against
the person from whom they proceed.
Since in the Daum and Williams cases the manifestations of the
offerees were ambiguous, and the offerors denied that they were acceptances, the unequivocal acceptance rule and its supporting principle of
interpretation were correctly applied with the result that no acceptance
was found in either case. In the Milone case, however, the offeror was
asserting the existence of an acceptance of his offer rather than denying
it. It would seem, therefore, that the unequivocal acceptance rule was
not literally applicable to that situation although the supporting principle of interpretation was wholly applicable. If the Washington court
had adverted to this principle which forms the basis of the unequivocal
GIbid. §233
6 Ibid. § 236 (d).
7247 P.2d 817 (Utah 1952).
8 161 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1947).

9 RESTATEMENT,
1936).

CONTRACTS § 58

10 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS

(1932); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 58, comment a (1932).

§ 72 (Rev. ed.
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acceptance rule, it might have interpreted the defendant's supposedly
equivocal manifestation to operate more strongly against him, and concluded that his act expressed acceptance. According to this analysis,
the Daum and Williams cases cannot be said to support fully the
interpretation of the court in the Milone case.
Another point of interest in the Milone case is the fact that the court
dismissed the evidence of trade usage with the statement that proof of
usage and custom will not make a contract where none exists. To the
extent that this statement means that usage cannot change a rule,
specifically the rule requiring mutual assent for the formation of a contract, it is correct. 1' However, with respect to evidence of trade usage
as an aid to interpretation, the statement is misleading. If the plaintiff
in the Milone case had proved a definite trade usage with respect to the
significance of a general contractor's act of using a subcontractor's bid,
then that usage could have been used to define the meaning of the
defendant's conduct.' That usage would have indicated the meaning
which the defendant should reasonably have expected that the plaintiff
would give to the defendant's act. Since both parties were engaged in
the same occupation in the same locale, such a trade usage would have
been operative in their transaction to the extent suggested." However,
the trade usage introduced into evidence in the trial court (use of a
subcontractor's bid gives rise to an implied contract to form a later
subcontract) was inconsistent with the theory of the plaintiff's case as
presented on appeal, and for this reason the court was probably correct
in disregarding it.
It is interesting to note that other courts have also been reluctant to
give much weight to trade usage in litigation between general contractors and subcontractors when the question presented has been
whether a contract had been formed. 4 In the majority of these few
cases a trade usage has been proven by the general contractor (offeree)
for the purpose of persuading the court to hold that the subcontractor's
bid was irrevocable after the general contractor had acted in reliance
upon it." If a court were to give effect to a trade usage that subcon" Ibid. § 249.
12 Ibid. § 246 (a). See also, CoRnIN,

Pwv. 153 (1941).

CONTRACTS

§ 555 at 127 (1951) ; 9 U. Cm. L.

CONTRActs § 248 (1932).
14 See Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949). But see

13 RESTATEMEN,

Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941) ; cf. Harris
v. Lillis, 24 So.2d 689 (La. App. 1946).
15 For a discussion of such irrevocable offers in the construction industry see Schultz.
The Firm Offer Puw-cle, 19 U. CHi. L. REv. 237 (1952).
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tractors ordinarily do not revoke their bids after notice of their use,
then the present rule that an offer is ordinarily revocable until accepted,
would be qualified to a considerable extent. For this reason, the courts
in such cases have generally declined to attach much significance to
such a usage, although one court has held a subcontractor's bid
irrevocable on the theory of promissory estoppel."8 If such a result
should be obtained hereafter in Washington, then a subcontractor in
light of the Milone case, could not be said to occupy an enviable position under the law.
One of the more significant aspects of the decision in the Milone case
is that it has disspelled some existing misapprehensions with respect to
the decision in the Western Asphalt case. That case was also a suit by
a subcontractor against a general contractor who refused to permit the
subcontractor to perform the offered work after his bid had been used
in securing the prime contract. The plaintiff there had submitted the
only bid received by the defendant, and had submitted that only at the
explicit request of the defendant. At the trial the plaintiff contended
that his submission of a bid was a service rendered for which the
defendant, by his request, could be deemed to have promised to pay."
In sustaining the grant of a new trial after a verdict for the defendant,
the supreme court held that the question of whether the defendant had
in fact agreed to pay for the service rendered, was properly left to
the jury.
The plaintiff in the Milone case relied greatly upon that decision;
however, as the court pointed out, he had failed to recognize the unusual
facts in that case which distinguished it readily from the present situation. There the general contractor had requested the plaintiff's bid,
while in the instant case the plaintiff's bid was unsolicited. Moreover,
the theory of the plaintiff in the Western Asphalt case was that use of
the bid was a receipt of services' while in the present case the plaintiff
apparently contented that the use of the bid constituted an exercise
of a power of acceptance created by the bid itself. According to the
court's interpretation of the plaintiff's offer in the Milone case, accept16 Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W2d 879 (1943) ;
cf. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941). Contra,
Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1933).
17 The Western Asphalt case has been criticized on the basis that the decision should
have been placed on quasi-contractual principles rather than on principles of mutual
assent.
Notes, 22 WAsH. L. REv. 139 (1947); 42 ILL. L. REv. 259 (1947).
' 8 Submitting such figures is usually an act of making an offer and is not an act of
rendering "service!' as such. If one were a mere professional estimator and not a
subcontractor the case could well be otherwise. See Stubner v. Raymond, 17 La.App.
216, 135 So. 676 (1931).
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ance by the defendant would have formed the subcontract itself with
the respective obligations to perform and pay for the work being conditional upon receipt of the prime contract. The defendant's obligation,
under that analysis, would have been to pay for the performance of
the work offered and not for the service of making an offer.1"
The decision in the Milone case clarifies Washington case law to the
extent that it places the Western Asphalt case in a less misleading perspective. On the other hand, the decision indicates the necessity for
reflecting carefully upon the rationale of the fundamental rules of
mutual assent before applying those rules to a given situation.
JOHN A. H~miLL
Balment Contracts-Destruction of Chattel-Effect of Promise to Return in Good
Condition. In St. Paul Fire & M3arine Ins. Co. v. Charles H. Lilly Co., 48 Wn2d
528, 295 P2d 299 (1956), D had rented an earth moving machine from Air-Mac Co.
under a written contract of bailment. The writing stated that D agreed to "keep and
maintain said personal property in good mechanical condition during the term of this
agreement ... and upon termination thereof to return to ... [bailor] ... the same in

good mechanical condition, save and except the usual wear and depreciation as may be
caused by reasonable use and wear thereof." Through no fault of D, the machine was
destroyed by fire. Air-Mac Co. collected the money on the fire insurance policy covering the machine and assigned its claims to the P insurance company. Relying on
Metropolitan Park District of Tacoma v. Olympic Athletic Club, 42 Wn2d 179, 254
P.2d 475 (1953), P brought an action against D on the written contract contending
that D's promise to return the machine in good condition amounted to a covenant to
stand as an insurer of the machine.
Held, for D, four judges dissenting, reversing the first decision reported in 46 Wn.2d
840, 286 P.2d 107 (1955). The promise to return the chattel in good condition, standing alone, was ineffective to enlarge the common law liability of the bailee for the loss
or destruction of the machine. The court approved the rule that a promise by the bailee
to stand as insurer of the bailed chattel will never be implied from the language in the
writing, but will be recognized and enforced only when an agreement to that effect
has been clearly and explicitly expressed. The language in the instant case appeared
to the court to be primarily a reiteration of the duties ordinarily imputed to a bailee
by law in absence of an agreement to the contrary. Moreover, the language here failed
to indicate clearly either that D had assumed an insurer's liability, or that both parties
had even contemplated the possible destruction of the machine.
In reaching this decision, the court expressly overruled the following decisions
insofar as they may indicate that this jurisdiction has adopted a contrary position:
Metropolitan Park District of Tacoma v. Olympic Athletic Club, 42 Wn2d 179, 254
P.2d 475 (1953) ; Bratt v. Poole, 105 Wash. 565, 178 Pac. 638 (1919) ; Alaska Coast
19 The theory that a contract could be formed, the obligations of which were conditional upon the formation of another contract between one of the parties and a
third person has caused some courts to regard one of the promises as illusory, with
the result that no consideration was found. Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman,
69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W2d 879 (1943); Meacham v. Pederson, 70 Wash. 479, 127 Pac.
114 (1912). Contra, Frederick Raff Co. v. Murphey, 110 Conn. 234, 147 Atl. 709
(1929) ; cf. Scott v. Moragues Lbr. Co., 202 Ala. 312, 80 So. 394 (1918).
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Co. v. Alaska Barge Co., 79 Wash. 216, 140 Pac. 334 (1914) ; Locomotive Exchange v.
Rucker Bros., 106 Wash. 278, 179 Pac. 859 (1919).
Pensions-Pension Statutes as Imposed Obligations of a Contractual Nature.
The case of Bakenhus v. Seattle, 48 Wn2d 695, 296 P2d 536 (1956), was an action by a
former city policeman for an increase in his statutory pension. P began employment with
the D city's police force in 1925. At that time a statute provided, inter alia, that a
policeman for a first class municipality was eligible for retirement with a life pension
after twenty-five years of service. The statute fixed the pension rate at one-half of
the salary attached to the rank held by the retiring policeman for the year immediately
preceding retirement. The pension fund was to be composed of compulsory nonrefundable contributions by the members of the force, and matching funds contributed
by the municipality. However, in 1937 this statute was amended. As amended it
provided for various additional fringe benefits, but changed the formula for ascertaining
the maximum pension payable to any retiring member. Under this amended formula no
member could receive more than $125 per month (which in 1947 was an amount equal
to one-half of the monthly salary of a police captain), and in no case were the member's
contributions to exceed an amount equal to 2% of the salary rate at which the maximum
pension was payable. In 1943 P was made a captain at a salary of $370 per month, yet
his pension contributions were deducted as if his salary were only $250 per month.
This was the proper procedure under the 1937 statute. In 1950 P retired and was
awarded the maximum pension payable under the 1937 statute, $125 per month. P then
began an action to compel D city to increase his pension to $185 per month, which
amount was the proper amount as calculated under the statute in force in 1925 when P
began work. P contended that his pension rights were to be determined by this 1925
statute, and that the 1937 amendment was void as to him.
Held, for P. The payments provided for by either statute were not gratuities, but
were deferred compensation for services. The 1925 statute was therefore regarded as
imposing upon the city an obligation of a contractual nature, and imparting to P a
correlative right, both of which accrued at the time P began employment. The 1925
statute was thought to be part of P's contract of employment; consequently, the 1937
amendment was held void as to P apparently on the ground that it violated the constitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligations of contracts. Following various California decisions, the court stated that the right to a pension, though
conditional, accrues at the time employment is begun, and that subsequent legislation is
ineffective to alter that right unless such legislation is reasonably necessary to maintain
the flexibility and integrity of the system.
The dissenting opinion questioned the existence of any contract of employment, and
maintained that even if one were presumed, P could be deemed to have assented to its
modification since he acquiesced in the diminution of his contribution to the fund.
A critical discussion of the conflicting theories utilized by various courts to resolve
similar statutory pension problems may be found in 56 CoLTum. L. REv. 251 (1956).

CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Redelivery Bond-Waiver of Rights. In the recent case of Adams
v. Thibault,' the court held that posting a redelivery bond by an attachment defendant who successfully defends against the court action of the
attaching plaintiff does not waive the right to recover for wrongful
attachment.
1149

Wash. Dec. 22, 297 P.2d 954 (1956).

